GENOTYPE DISCRIMINATION: THE COMPLEX CASE
FOR SOME LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION
HENRYT. GREELYt
INTRODUCTION

Substance and process, process and substance. They dance
through law; they dance through life. The big news from the dueling
publications of "the" human genome was that humans have only
about one-third more genes than round worms; we share versions of
about ninety-nine percent of our genes with mice. The substance of
the genes is important to the creature they produce, but so is when
those genes are turned on, how high, and for how long. In genomes,
the expression is as important as what is expressed. The substance of
legislation is important; so is the process-the public discussions,
debates, and understandings-through which it is made and
implemented. The federal government should prohibit some uses of
genetic information in decisions by employers and health insurers,
but how those prohibitions are argued and implemented may be
more important than the fact of their adoption.
This piece begins, in Part I, by demonstrating that genetic
discrimination is not likely to have serious effects on a substantial
number of people. It then points out, in Part II, weaknesses in both
many of the justifications for legislation banning genetic
discrimination and many of the methods suggested for doing so. It
ends, with Part III, by supporting carefully crafted, and narrowly
argued, federal legislation limiting genotype discrimination. There is
a good case for such laws, but there just is not a case that is both good
and simple. And to argue the case without using the shades of gray, to
debate point by (counter) point, can do more harm than good.
I. THE LIMITED REALITY OF GENETIC DISCRIMINATION

Genetic discrimination is a much greater threat in people's fears
than it is in reality, today or in the foreseeable future, for both
scientific and social reasons. Most of the discussion that follows
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concerns the science behind fears of human genetics; I have tried to
make it easily understandable to legal audiences.
An accurate
understanding of the power, and the limits, of genetic prediction is
crucial to a useful analysis of genetic discrimination.
A. Genes andDisease
Start with some definitions. People do not have "genes" for
disease. As far as we know, all humans have the same set of genes,
about 32,000 of them,' except for those few genes on the Y
chromosome, found in men and not in women. 2 Those genes come
in many variations; indeed, for the most part, the human genes are
just human variations of genes found in other primates, mammals,
animals, or broader sets of life forms. Any two humans, on average,
will be identical in their DNA sequences 99.9% of the time and
99.99% of the time in the regions of genes that contain the genetic
code for constructing proteins (the so-called exons).
The few
differences make up genetic variations or different "alleles" of the
genes. Traits or diseases are considered "genetic" when a person with
a particular allele has a much greater chance than average of having a
particular trait or disease-more broadly, when the genotype is
correlated with a particular "phenotype."
Progress in human genetics has led to fears about genetic
discrimination, particularly in insurance and employment, because of
the perceived power of human genetics to make predictions about
people's future lives-and hence future health insurance risks, time of
death, and employment productivity. The popular vision of a genetic
disease is something that is caused only by a particular allele, that
cannot be avoided by a person with that allele, that cannot be treated,
and that leads to an inevitable death. And, indeed, sometimes human
genetics can lead to predictions about people that are powerful, both
because they are highly likely to come true and because they would
have substantial consequences on those persons' lives.
Huntington disease, 3 a neurodegenerative disorder, may be the

This is far fewer than many scientists expected. Elizabeth Pennisi, The Human
Genome; 291 ScIENcE 1177, 1178 (2001).
There are also some conditions caused by having too many or too few copies of
genes. Down syndrome, which is caused by having an extra copy of Chromosome 21
and which involves mental retardation along with a variety of physical ailments, isan
example. It is not clear whether these kinds of conditions are usually included in the
term "genetic."
3 Even the names of some genetic (and nongenetic) diseases are controversial.
In
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paradigm for this kind of genetic condition. It is only the product of a
genetic variation. As far as we know, the only way to get Huntington
disease is to have an excessive number of repeats of three bases of
DNA---cytosine, adenine, and guanine, or CAG-in a particular
stretch of a gene found near the end of the short arm of Chromosome
4. Most people have 10 to 20 repeated CAGs; only people with 36 or
more ever develop Huntington disease. No one with more than 38
repeats is known to have avoided the disease, except by dying first
from something else.
There is no significant treatment for
Huntington disease; death follows inevitably after about fifteen years
of progressive physical and mental disability.4 Many childhood
genetic diseases, like Tay-Sachs disease, are similarly implacable.
But Huntington disease and other certain and inevitable links
between genetic variations and disease are proving to be the
exceptions, not the rule. In some genetic diseases, the physiological
defect may follow inevitably from the genetic variation, but disease
and death may not. For example, phenylketonuria ("PKU"), a genetic
disorder affecting about one birth in 10,000, is caused by the inability
to metabolize the essential amino acid phenylalanine. This leads to
the build up of excessive amounts of phenylalanine, which then
causes mental retardation. If a child is known from an early age to
have PKU, however, an arduous diet, low in phenylalanine, prevents
retardation so effectively that PKU screening at birth is now required
in all U.S. states. Even some of the more common genetic diseasescystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, and beta thalassemia-although not
curable, are now susceptible to treatments that have expanded the
quantity and improved the quality of the lives of those born with
defective versions of the responsible genes.
Even more importantly, many alleles associated with nonrare
diseases, particularly common diseases, increase the bearer's risk-but
recent years authors and journals have split over making disease names possessiveHuntington's disease--or not-Huntington disease. This Article will follow Occam's
Razor (Occam Razor?) and omit the possessive form.

Even in Huntington disease, the age of onset varies for reasons that are not
clear.

Most people are diagnosed in their thirties through fifties, but some are

diagnosed much earlier and a few much later. There is some correlation between a
greater number of repeats and earlier onset, but it is not perfect.
Phenylketonuria and its associated diet leave a trace that the rest of us
encounter. The Food and Drug Administration has required that all packages

containing the artificial sweetener aspartame (known commercially as Nutrasweet)
must contain a warning that the product contains phenylalanine. The next time you
have a diet soft drink, look on the label for "Warning: Phenylketonurics. This product
contains phenylalanine."
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not all the way. Having one copy of disease-related alleles of either of
the genes BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 increase a woman's chances of being
diagnosed with breast or ovarian cancer. Her lifetime risk of breast
cancer increases from roughly 10% to somewhere between 50% and
85%. Her risk of ovarian cancer rises from about 1% to about 30%.
(These ratios, the percentage of those with a given genotype who
develop a particular phenotype, are known as the genotype's
"penetrance.") No one knows yet what determines which women with
these mutated alleles get the disease-variations in other genes,
environmental influences, or just bad luck. It is clear, though, that
not all women with these alleles get either disease; most women with
the alleles do not get ovarian cancer.
There clearly are genetic variations, still largely unknown, that are
associated with higher (and lower) risk of asthma, diabetes, coronary
artery disease, stroke, schizophrenia, and a host of other common
diseases. But, for the most part, the change in risk associated with any
given allele seems likely to be quite small. This should not be
surprising. The strong associations between genetic variations and
disease-the alleles with a high penetrance-are the easy ones to find.
A gene for asthma with the near-perfect penetrance of Huntington
disease, or even the penetrance of BRCA 1, would stand out in family
studies and would be easy to find. More genetic links to common
diseases are probably proving hard to find because they are not very
powerful.
For common diseases, the genetic story is likely to be extremely
complicated. Alzheimer disease provides a useful example. An
American has about a 10-15% chance of being diagnosed with
Alzheimer disease, usually after the age of sixty-five. 6 Three genespresenilin 1, presenilin 2, and the amyloid precursor protein genehave now been found where unusual alleles lead almost certainly to
the disease, and usually several decades earlier than usual. Mutations
in presenilin 1 may be found in as many as 1 person in 1000; the other
two alleles are vanishingly rare. Altogether, they may account for
about 1% of the people who get Alzheimer disease.
Another gene, APOE, is also associated with Alzheimer disease.
Everyone has two copies of the APOE gene, one inherited from each
parent. This gene has three common alleles, called APOE 2, APOE 3,
6 The precise risk is not known in part because of uncertainty over the diagnosis,

and hence the incidence, of Alzheimer disease. It is very difficult to distinguish
between Alzheimer disease and other forms of dementia in the elderly; the only
definitive method is through autopsies, which often are not performed.
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and APOE 4.7 The APOE 3 allele is the most common, making up
about 70% of all the versions found. People who inherit two copies of
the APOE 4 allele-about 2% of the population-have a very high risk
of getting Alzheimer disease, although at the usual age. People with
one copy of the APOE 4 allele and one copy of either APOE 3 or
APOE 2 make up about 15% of the population. Their risk of
Alzheimer disease is somewhere between 30% and 50%, 2 to 5 times
higher than the general population risk. But someone with one
APOE 4 allele is still less likely to be diagnosed with Alzheimer disease
than to be diagnosed with it. On the other hand, a person with two
APOE 2 alleles, about 1% of the population, has a very low chance of
being diagnosed with Alzheimer disease.
Thus, the same disease is strongly genetic for about 2% of the
population, weakly genetic for about 15% of the population, and,
genetically, nearly ruled out for about 1% of the population. The
other 7/8 of the population, which will account for most people with
Alzheimer disease, have, as far as we now know, risks that are neither
increased nor decreased significantly by their genes. While other
alleles of other genes are under investigation for association with
Alzheimer disease, the logic of the discovery process means that the
strong associations are likely to be rare; the less-rare associations are
likely to be weak.
The relationship between genetic variations and disease is thus
complicated. For some few, unlucky people, possession of a particular
allele is a very strong predictor of disease, which may or may not be
treatable. Most people, though, are likely to have much less powerful
genetically predicted disease risks. For example, my particular genetic
variations might make my risk of adult onset diabetes 8% instead of
5%, but my risk of coronary artery disease 12% instead of 15%. The
genetic discoveries that lie ahead most likely will have relatively small
effects on someone's predicted risk of a disease.8 The implications for
the risk of genetic discrimination are obvious.
B.

Genes and Society

Whether the health risks predicted by genetic variations are big or
7 APOE 1, the first version to be found, was strongly associated with
a cholesterolrelated disease. It turned out to be quite rare.
And, of course, if there turns out to be a useful intervention to prevent the

disease from occurring in people with the genetic risk, preventive measures developed
from knowledge of the genotype might actually decrease the tested person's risk.
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small, they can lead to genetic discrimination only if those risks are
taken into consideration in making decisions. Concern about genetic
discrimination in the United States has focused on health coverage
and employment. Structural reasons exist, though, that limit the
extent to which genetic risks will be taken into consideration in those
areas.
Start with health care. Note first that genetic discrimination in
health insurance is almost exclusively an American problem; the
United States is unique among wealthy nations in not guaranteeing
health coverage to nearly all of its citizens, regardless of either
medical or financial status. In the hoped-for event that the United
States joins the rest of the rich world by guaranteeing its residents
health coverage, genetic discrimination in health insurance will be
largely moot.9 But the structure of the current U.S. health care
financing system, for all its many flaws, exposes only a few people to
the risk of genetic discrimination.
Genetic information that leads to conclusions about a person's
likely future health care costs can directly affect whether that person
gets health coverage only if the insurer can decline to provide that
coverage because of those higher risks, a practice known as "medical
underwriting." The vast majority of Americans do not have medically
underwritten health coverage; they are covered without regard to
their future health risks. Nearly 40 million Americans are covered
through the federal Medicare program with no medical underwriting.
Another roughly 30 million poor Americans are covered by the statefederal Medicaid program, again with no medical underwriting.
About 140 to 150 million Americans are covered through employersusually their own, their spouses', or their parents'. The KassebaumKennedy Act of 1996, also known as HIPAA, bars almost every
employer that provides health coverage from using medical
information to pick and choose whom to cover among eligible
employees and their dependents.'0 About 45 million Americans have
no health insurance, almost always because they either cannot afford
to purchase it independently or do not choose to do so.

It would, most likely, continue to be possible for people to buy health insurance
to supplement their guaranteed coverage, as in Canada, or to buy private insurance
instead of the government-guaranteed coverage, as in the United Kingdom or
Germany. As long as the basic, government-guaranteed coverage is adequate, neither
alternative raises serious concerns.
10Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104192, 110 Stat. 1936.
9
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So who could be victims of genetic discrimination in health
coverage? Only people who purchase individually underwritten
health coverage or who would purchase it if it were not made either
entirely unavailable or exorbitantly expensive because of medical
underwriting. There is no exact count of how many people fall into
either of those categories; my best guess is about 10 to 20 million.
W
%hatever the actual total, it is a substantial number, but well under
10% of the U.S. population." One's lifetime chance of needing, at
some point, to purchase medically underwritten coverage is higher
than the current percentage of people in that situation, but, most
likely, it will remain low.
The conclusion that genetic discrimination in health coverage
threatens few people may be a surprising one, but it is consistent with
most of the available evidence. There have been a few studies that
have purported to find such genetic discrimination. They generally
have relied on unexamined reports from people who said they had
been discriminated against and on the second-hand reports of genetic
counselors who had been told that this had occurred. The shortage of
clear, well-documented examples of genetic discrimination in health
insurance is noteworthy. So is the fact that health insurers have not
announced that they would underwrite for genetic-related disease
risks. One careful study, in fact, found that insurance agents, the most
important source for medically underwritten coverage, go out of their
way to avoid disqualifing people because of genetic risks.2 In more
than forty states some form of genetic discrimination by health
insurers is illegal; in all states, health insurers would find it deeply
unpopular and politically dangerous.
Genetic discrimination also seems unlikely in employment
decisions. For many traits genetic tests are not going to add to
information an employer can already get about an employee or job
applicant. Any speculative genetic evidence of predisposition to
intelligence, good judgment, dedication, and punctuality would pale

Some people who are currently covered through employers will lose that
coverage either by job changes, changes in family status, or an employer's decision to
drop all coverage. And some people currently covered by Medicaid will, by increasing
income or assets or by changes in their status, lose that coverage. But it is equally
certain that some people who do not now have employer-provided coverage will get it.
12SMark A. Hall & Steven S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health Insurers' Use of Genetic
InfuJ-matio: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66 AM. J. HUM. GENETIcs 293 (2000)
(finding that "there are almost no well-documented cases of health insurers either
asking for or using presymptomatic genetic test results in their undenwriting
decision").
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in comparison to better evidence of those characteristics acquired
through direct observation. Why test genes when you can directly test
for or observe the relevant traits? Predictive tests also lose power
because of employee turnover. Imagine a job applicant with a
predisposition to a fatal condition. At the time of hiring, the
predisposition can be detected by genetic test even if the applicant
presents no symptoms. If the likely onset of serious symptoms is ten
years away, the employer has to discount those future costs, not just
because they are in the future, but because of the high chance the
applicant will have changed jobs. (And, depending on the firm's
pension program, any remaining costs might be outweighed by the
savings on retirement benefits.)
There are two more realistic concerns about employment
The
The first is the cost of health benefits.
discrimination.
employment-related health coverage for those 150 million people is
not free; employers pay the bulk of it, albeit with the help of
substantial federal and state tax subsidies. For most employers,
employees with more health problems lead to higher health benefit
bills; for the many employers, including most large employers, who
self-insure, those costs are felt almost immediately. Some, including
an earlier version of myself,' 3 have argued that these health care costs
would provide a strong financial incentive for employers to avoid
hiring or retaining people with genetically predictably high health
costs. There is no sign that this has happened-well-documented
examples of genetic discrimination in employment are as rare as they
are in health coverage. Given the rarity of powerful disease genes, the
weaknesses of common disease genes, the speed of employee
turnover, and the vast number of other causes of health costs, I now
believe that the financial incentives for such discrimination will only
be significant in uncommon cases like Huntington disease.
The second concern revolves around health and safety risks to
either the employee or to others. A few people have genetic variations
that make exposure to particular conditions or chemicals dangerous.
This kind of currently uncommon knowledge of occupational
exposure risk could lead employers to attempt to select out
susceptible workers rather than provide uniformly safe workplaces.
The genetic argument can also be made about the safety of third
parties. One might argue that a person with a Huntington disease
13 Henry

T. Greely, Health Insurance, Employment Discrimination, and the Genetics

Revolution, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT (DanielJ. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992).
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allele should not become an aircraft pilot or a bus driver, because of
the loss of motor control that comes with the disease. This argument
will usually founder on the possibilities for continued testing for the
actual traits. A pilot who will get Huntington disease could be tested
regularly for motor control and could be relieved of flying duties
when problems arise. There may be a few cases where the onset is so
sudden that such testing for the trait would not suffice.
Some
employers might have an incentive to discriminate against people at
high genetic risk for such a condition, but the genetic variation would
have to be highly predictive and the condition's onset unforeseeable,
both rare situations.
II. PROBLEMS WITH REGULATING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
Whatever the likely present and future scope of genetic
discrimination, commentators, politicians, and legislators have been
busy calling for its regulation. In doing so, they have made a wide
variety of mistakes. Figuring out why and how to push for regulation
of genetic discrimination is best begun by examining what not to do.
A. IWeaknesses in theJustifications
The previous Part should have cast doubt on one reason asserted
for the regulation of genetic discrimination. Failure to ban such
discrimination will not make the sky fall, the employment markets
crumble, or hasten a Brave New World of genetic castes.'5 Most
genetic variations will just not be that powerful; most forms of
employment and insurance are just not that sensitive.
" A genetically linked condition called Long QT syndrome might be an example.
It is associated with sudden death from heart attacks in middle age, often with little or

no warning.
See grtnerally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEw WORLD (1932). Brave New World
actually portrays a caste system sustained by a more complicated technology than is
commonly remembered. People are born, inside artificial wombs, as clones of up to
ninety-six individuals through the forced budding mechanism of the "Bokonovsky
Process." Those clones, however, are each produced from a separate fertilized egg.
The oxaries that produce the eggs and the sperm that fertilizes them are from selected
individuals, but the eggs and the sperm are not themselves selected; the resulting
zygotes (and clones) are a large set of identical "mins" created by the random sexual
mixing of alleles. The different castes are not just the result of the selection of the
"parents" of particular clones, but of pre- and post-natal training and conditioning,
including the use of oxygen starvation and alcohol poisoning before birth to stunt the
Delta and Epsilon castes. (In the context of this Counterpoint, it is ironic that an
earlier novel by Huxley was called Point/Counterpoint.)
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But another reason creeps into the argument with the very term
used: genetic "discrimination." The Civil Rights revolution, and the
subsequent flourishing of movements seeking equal rights, variously
defined, for women, the disabled, and gays and lesbians, have made
"discrimination" into a bad word, connoting some evil intent. The
"discriminating shopper" is not a phrase often heard anymore because
the adjective raises images not of careful choices based on the quality
of goods being sold, but of immoral choices based on irrelevant
personal qualities of the seller. To label something "discrimination"
is, today, half the political battle in regulating it.
Of course, people discriminate constantly, in ways that usually
have no moral weight. People discriminate in choosing life partners,
living quarters, and law schools. Several decades ago, the "bad"
discrimination was commonly talked about, at least in legal circles, as
"invidious" discrimination, but the "invidious" has become much less
common.
The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
provides some insight into what makes us worry about certain grounds
for choices when the Court looks more closely at choices based on
"suspect classifications" or on "fundamental interests." These two
concepts are useful in thinking about claims of rights, whether those
claims are made to the judiciary under the Federal Equal Protection
Clause or are made politically to legislatures. Discrimination is unfair
if it is based on a type of difference that should not be taken into
account-disabled status is a statutory example-or if it involves
something of great importance-public primary and secondary
education could be another legislative example.
Our society's failure to guarantee health coverage or employment
makes the "fundamental interest" argument difficult. But calling
decisions made on the basis of genetic variations "discrimination"
comes easily because such variations share some of the characteristics
of other grounds that our society has concluded are improper
discrimination. Like race, sex, national origin, and illegitimacy, they
are neither voluntarily chosen by their bearer nor readily changeable
by that bearer. Like those characteristics and religion, they have been
the asserted basis for oppression and stigmatization in the past-about
60,000 Americans were compulsorily sterilized in the twentieth
A search of the Lexis "genfed" library shows the term "invidious discrimination"
appeared in 11.6% of federal cases from 1966 through 1970 where the word
"discrimination" appeared, 6.0% of the cases from 1976 through 1980, 3.1% of the
cases from 1986 through 1990, and only 2.0% of the cases from 1996 through 2000573 cases out of over 28,000. The term seems to be dying out.
16
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century's eugenics movement. And, like many of those traits, they can
be argued to be part of a person's essence, something that should not
have to be denied.
Should genetic variations be treated as
constitutional "suspect classifications," like race, sex, national origin,
or their statutory equivalents, disability, old age, or sexual preference?
The resemblances are tempting but, I believe, both superficial and
dangerous.
The resemblances are superficial because they confuse a person's
genotype with its expression. A person's genome is unchosen 7 and, at
present at least, not susceptible to intentional change."5 Even if these
are morally critical points, 'q genetic variations affect people only as
the),are expressed and, as detailed above, the same genetic variations
can express themselves quite differently, as a result of treatment,
environment, or chance. A child does not choose PKU. But the
child's parents can choose to avoid the mental retardation that follows
untreated PKU. Similarly, the history of oppression based on genetics
is one of oppression based on expressed traits-feeblemindedness,
criminality, slovenliness-that were thought, largely incorrectly, to
have a genetic basis. Although the concept of recessive disorders,
central to Mendel's discovery of the underlying rules of genetics, was
well known during the eugenics period, people who were only carriers
of recessive genes were not sterilized. Only people who actually
expressed the traits were sterilized. The gap between the genetic
variations as the), exist and the way in which they are expressed in the
whole person also argues against the idea that "Genes 'R' Us," in other
words, that our genes are our essence.
That a person carries one copy of the genetic variation that, when
present in two copies, usually produces cystic fibrosis should not be
viewed as the same as that person's race, sex, national origin, religion,
or sexual preference. For better or for worse, the latter characteristics
have great significance, at least in our culture. The unexpressed

)7

There are people alive, almost all still children, whose parents chose to

continue their gestation after examining one or more genetic sites through prenatal
testing or, more recently, prenatal genetic diagnosis. Even aside from the limited
extent of such choice, limited both in the number of genes examined and in the
number of people affected, the choice was the parents', not the person's.
1 The successful clinical use of gene therapy could make a person's
genes
.changeable," but only a small number of genes and usually only in a few special types
of cell.
Mere nonvoluntariness or immutability should not confer, by themselves,
pecial status. We do not voluntarily choose our birthdays or our social security
numbers and cannot (readily) change either.
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genotype has no such significance. And although the expressed
genotype might have similar significance-or might even correlate
strongly with a person's race, sex, or religion-the validity of
discrimination based on that trait should be evaluated on the
expressed trait, not on whether or not it has a genetic origin.
Whether a person with cancer should be subject to discrimination
should be evaluated based on the social significance and
consequences of cancer, not on whether her particular case of cancer
was or was not associated with an inherited genetic variation.
Promoting genetic variations to suspect status, either
constitutionally or through giving them special legislative significance,
is not only inappropriate but potentially damaging. By telling people
that their genetic variations are so important-are the equivalents of
race, sex, religion, and other suspect classifications-we encourage
them to believe that it is true, in ways that are both inaccurate and
pernicious.
This is not to say that using genetic traits as a basis for
discrimination is free from moral question. If the trait is irrelevant to
the decision at hand, it could still be disapproved of as arbitrary and
hence, to some extent, immoral.2 But as a general matter we allow
wide scope for private citizens and private businesses to act arbitrarily
and capriciously in whom they hire, fire, or serve-as long as they do
not act on the basis of specified impermissible criteria. 2 For a private
firm to use a completely irrelevant genetic variation as a grounds for
making employment or insurance decisions might be condemnably
arbitrary but would seem a slim argument for legislative intervention.
B. DefinitionalDilemmas
Statutes and proposed statutes regulating "genetic discrimination"
typically forbid someone, usually an employer or health insurer, from
taking
action
based
on
"genetic
information,"
"genetic

20

See the further discussion of this point infra Part II.C.

21 Of course, irrelevant and purposefully arbitrary distinctions
may be useful, such

as randomly drawing names for a jury venire or flipping a coin (or playing a hand of
poker) to resolve a tied election. See Henry T. Greely, The Equality of Allocation by
, Lot, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113 (1977).
22 Or, in the case of a business, do not withhold
an essential service. Common
carrier requirements are historical remnants of the second concern. The Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994), which effectively
requires hospitals to provide care to all patients with emergency conditions, is a
modem example.

20011

GENOTYPE DISCRIMINATION

1495

characteristics," or the results of "genetic tests." What do those terms
mean? Existing statutes generally use one of two approaches-one
narrow, one broad, both seriously flawed.
The narrow definition bans the use of the results of "genetic
tests" and defines those genetic tests as tests of "DNA." The Wisconsin
statute provides an example of such a definition, now used in
relatively few states:
(1) In this section, "genetic test" means a test using deoxyribonucleic
acid extracted from an individual's cells in order to determine the
presence of a genetic disease or disorder or the individual's
predisposition for a particular genetic disease or disorder.
This has the advantage of being relatively clear, but the
disadvantage of being easy to circumvent, intentionally or not.
Genetic information can come from many sources other than DNA
tests. Tests for carrier status of Tay-Sachs disease, sickle-cell anemia,
and APOE status, for example, have all been routinely done, in the
past or in the present, on proteins, not on DNA. The genetic
variations involved in these conditions lead the body to produce
slightly different proteins, which can be separated out and tested for
without dealing with DNA. Those "genetic tests," and others, are
routinely done without using any DNA. Someone who wanted to
circumvent a narrow statute could also do DNA-based tests by looking
not at the DNA itself but at RNA, produced from the DNA template.
The DNA necessarily defines a particular RNA sequence, which, when
read, can provide full information about the DNA sequence that
coded for it.
Many statutes now take into account these broader ways of testing
for genetic variations. Michigan's statute provides a good example:
(b) "Genetic information" means information about a gene, gene
product, or inherited characteristic derived from a genetic test.
(c) "Genetic test" means the analysis of human DNA, RNA,
chromosomes, and those proteins and metabolites used to detect
heritable or somatic disease-related genotypes or karyotypes for clinical
purposes. A genetic test must be generally accepted in the scientific and
medical communities as being specifically determinative for the
presence, absence, or mutation of a gene or chromosome in order to
qualify under this definition. 4
This broader version of the narrow definition fails in an even

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.89(1) (West 1997).
: MICH. COMe. Lws ANN. § 550.1401 (West 2000).
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more important way. Some "genetic information" can be obtained
without doing any tests for the purpose of identifying genetic
variations. A family practitioner, on seeing a twenty-five-year-old
patient with a cholesterol level of 650, should suspect the genetic
disorder, familial hypercholesteremia.2 5 A pediatrician can, with great
accuracy, diagnose whether a child has the chromosomal disorder
Down syndrome without doing any biochemical tests, through the
child's appearance and, later, behavior. And any of us, on very little
inspection, can make a very good, albeit not perfect, guess as to
whether a person carries a copy of the SRY gene, and is male, or does
not, and is female. Similarly, the family history that is part of any
good physician's examination reveals some probabilistic genetic
information.2 r' A person with a parent who died of Huntington disease
has a fifty percent chance of carrying the Huntington allele. A person
with three or four close relatives, on the same side of her family, who
had early-onset breast or ovarian cancer has a much higher than
average chance of carrying a mutated BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 gene. A
narrow definition of genetic discrimination, based on the results of
genetic tests, misses all these sources of genetic information.
This is not a novel insight. A group assembled by the National
Human Genome Research Institute of the National Institutes of
Health early on recommended a broad definition of genetic
information, which has been adopted by numerous states. ' A typical
broad statute forbids discrimination based on genetic information,
defined:
(2) "Genetic information" means information about inherited genes or
chromosomes, and of alterations thereof, whether obtained from an
25 Some of the "genetic test" definitions deal
with the genetic implications of
biochemical tests that were not done for the purpose of finding genetic information by
expressly excluding them from the definition. For example, the Minnesota statute
provides that "'genetic test' does not include a cholesterol test or other test not
conducted for the purpose of determining the presence or absence of a person's gene
or genes." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139(2) (b) (West 1999). The Texas statute sa)s

that genetic tests do not include: "(A) a routine physical examination or a routine test

performed as a part of a physical examination; (B) chemical, blood, or urine analysis;
(C) test to determine drug use; or (D) test for the presence of the human
immunodeficiency virus." TEX.INS. CODE ANN. § 21.73 (Vernon 2000).
26 The Oklahoma statute expressly excludes family history:
"'Genetic information'

means information derived from the results of a genetic test. Genetic information
shall not include family history ....
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3614.1.B.3 (West
1999).
27 See Kathy L. Hudson et al., GeneticDiscrimination and Health
Insurance: An Urgent
Need for Reform, 270 SCIENCE 391 (1995); Karen H. Rothenberg, Genetic Information and
HealthInsurance: State LegislativeApproaches, 23J.L. MED. & ETHICS 312 (1995).
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individual or family member, that is scientifically or medically believed
to predispose an individual to disease, disorder or syndrome, or believed
to be associated with a statistically significant increased risk of
development of a disease, disorder or syndrome.

The broad approach has its own set of problems, stemming from

an unintended "feedback effect." If a person has been diagnosed with
Huntington disease, that provides certain genetic information-that
person must carry at least one mutated allele of the gene that causes
the disease. If a person has been diagnosed with sickle-cell anemia,
that is conclusive evidence that she carries two copies of a gene with
the particular sickle-cell mutations. If this medical information is
treated as genetic information because it yields inferences about
genes, the broad definition effectively outlaws all consideration of
medical conditions that have some probabilistic association with
inherited genetic variations.
Careful delineation is important in another respect. A legislature
needs to consider carefully the scope of limitations on the use of
genetic information it wants to impose. Not all users raise the same
issue, nor do all uses. Laws banning the use of genetic information in
"insurance" could be overly broad. Life insurance is not the same as
health insurance. A standard, low-benefit whole life insurance policy
is not the same as a high-benefit term life insurance policy. Disability
insurers or long term care insurers may similarly have legitimate
reasons to worry that people who know that their genetic variations
put them at high risk will disproportionately buy that insurance (socalled "adverse selection"). In the United States, health coverage of
some sort should be viewed as a necessity; life insurance, disability
insurance, or long term care insurance seem less compelling. In all
other rich countries, health insurance is universal and genetic
discrimination has little importance in that context. On the other
hand, in the United Kingdom, borrowers, for mortgages or even
automobile loans, often have to get individually underwritten credit
life insurance. For them, genetic discrimination in life insurance may
have a much greater negative affect than genetic discrimination in
privately sold health insurance. Insurance for long term care, a newly
created and still struggling insurance line, might be killed by adverse

selection from people who knew they were at genetically higher risk
for Alzheimer disease. A public policy in favor of promoting such
insurance might argue against banning genetic discrimination for it.

", DEL. CODEANN. tit. 18, § 2317(a) (2) (2000).
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C. The Problem ofPolitics
The biggest problem in regulating genetic discrimination is not
the method of regulation but the campaign to obtain it. Advocates of
regulating genetic discrimination will be tempted to build support by
exaggerating the importance of the problem. In so doing, they may
make the cure worse than the disease.
The problem can be exaggerated first by scaring people about the
likely significance of current and future genetic discoveries. If people
are convinced that human genetics research will lead to the discovery
of strong genetic associations for most diseases-like the perfect
association between genetic variations and diagnosis (and inevitable
death) from Huntington disease-protection from discrimination will
seem more important. Ignoring the many structural limitations on,
for example, the use of medical underwriting in health insurance will
further help make the case for antidiscrimination legislation.
Pointing out the important use of rare genetic associations to find
mechanisms of disease and targets for preventive or therapeutic
intervention, though accurate, will not obviously build support for
such legislation. Scaring people about their own risk of genetic
discrimination will.
Similarly, the association of a person's genotype with her
"essence" increases the perceived importance of protecting that
essence and preventing discrimination based on it. Perhaps the best
example is George Annas's use of the metaphor of an individual's
genome as her "future diary." A diary-secret, important, uniquely
individual-is a powerful metaphor for building political support. But
it is almost completely inaccurate. For most people their genetic risks
will be a relatively small contributor to the overall risks of life, just one
component to be added to environment and chance. The fact that no
two genomes are identical (apart from those of identical twins) does
make them unique, but our fingerprints are even more uniquely our
own (identical twins have different prints) without justifying careful
protection. Stressing the deeply personal, unique, and important
nature of an individual's genotype may build political support, but at a
cost to accurate public understanding of the real significance of
genetic variation and human genetics research.
Unhappily, efforts to "hype" the dangers of genetic discrimination
or the importance of an individual's genome find an environment
29

GeorgeJ. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: ProtectingCoded 'FutureDianes,

270JAMA 2346, 2346 (1993).
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receptive to such exaggeration. Biotechnology firms, living and dying
by, or in the shadow of, the stock markets, have a real financial
interest in convincing the public of the crucial importance of genes,
particularly the genes they are studying. Researchers, seeking jobs,
grants, tenure, and glory, also have incentives to exaggerate the
importance of their work. More innocently, any researcher (even a
law professor) likes to believe that what she does is important-this
ubiquitous incentive to perceive one's work as important must play
some role in the hyping of the genome. Even politicians get into the
act. The joint press conference of President Clinton and Prime
Minister Blair announcing the "completion" of the sequencing of the
human genome was not short on hyperbole. And, of course, all of
these incentives to stress the crucial nature of human genetics and the
human genome are covered by the various communications media,
which also have an interest in stressing the importance of what they
cover.
Exaggerating the importance of human genetic variations has
important costs. First, it makes the public more frightened of genetic
research and its possible implications. If this were to reduce popular
or political support for such research, the alleviation of much human
suffering might be delayed or stopped entirely. Second, it increases
the extent to which people see their lives as controlled by their genes,
a process Susan Wolf has termed "geneticism." James Watson was
once quoted as saying, "'We used to think our fate was in our stars.
Now we know ... our fate is in our genes.' 3' To the extent people
believe this is true, our culture will change in ways that are both
scientifically unsound and socially pernicious. The fight between
"nature" and "nurture" is a long one.32 Clearly, the science of genetics
has helped move the conventional wisdom on that question toward
nature from the nearly exclusive emphasis in the 1960s on nurture.
But it should not be allowed to move the balance too far. The only
plausible answer to the question of "nature or nurture," for most
people, most of the time, is "yes." Both play a crucial role.
Exaggerating the importance of genetics, even for the "good cause" of
passing legislation against genetic discrimination, may well do more
harn than good.

Susan Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination"

Toward the Broader Harm of

G;cntiism, 23J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 345, 346 (1995).
Leonjaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, Mar. 20,1989, at 62, 65.
S"tgnraly G RL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE (1991).
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III. THE CASE FOR CAREFUL REGULATION
OF GENOTYPE DISCRIMINATION

So far, I have discussed the weaknesses in many calls for the
regulation of genetic discrimination, perhaps confusing some readers
as to whether this piece was the "point" or the "counterpoint." But
there is a strong case for some carefully argued and crafted limitations
on discrimination in employment and health insurance based on an
individual's genotype. This Part lays out first the "why" and then the
"how" of that case.
There are three good reasons for federal regulation of some kinds
of genetic discrimination: to protect those few people whose unlucky
genetic inheritance puts them at risk for rational discrimination, to
protect those people who are at risk for irrational and ill-informed
genetic discrimination, and, most importantly, to allay public fears
that could impede important genetic research.
The science of human genetics is showing us that a small
percentage of people carry inherited genetic variations that put them
at high risk for serious illness. About 1 person in 20,000 carries a
Huntington disease allele, perhaps one person in a thousand carries a
mutated gene that will almost certainly lead to Alzheimer disease, and
maybe 1 or 2 women in 1000 carry mutated genes that move their risk
of getting breast cancer from about 10% to somewhere from 50% to
85%.
An insurer or employer might well rationally decide to
discriminate against those people if they receive their health
insurance or are in an employment market in which such
discrimination is even possible. The vast majority of us carry genetic
variations that put us at higher- or lower-than-average risk for
particular diseases, but not greatly higher or lower risks-and not
different enough to prompt rational discrimination.
Still, those people who are at risk should be protected. Both
employment and health insurance are important parts of life in
contemporary America. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
and equivalent state laws provide some employment protection for
people who suffer from disabling diseases. We can afford to provide
both employment and health insurance protection to those few
people whose genetic variations yield a firm prediction that they will
suffer from such diseases. Preventing such discrimination against a
small number of people, at least if done through carefully drawn
legislation, should have only minor costs to the economy but major
benefits for those few people whosejobs or health insurance would be
saved.
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Second, everyone is at some risk for irrational genetic
discrimination. As I was finishing this Counterpoint, I read a
newspaper report of a complaint filed by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Burlington Northern
Corporation.)- According to the report, the railroad had been
subjecting employees with carpal tunnel syndrome to a genetic test,
looking for genetic variations that were linked to susceptibility to the
syndrome. 4 There is no good reason to expect those employees to
have that genetic condition.' But someone, somewhere in Burlington
Northern's corporate structure somehow decided this testing, done
without informed consent, was a good idea. A general ban against the
use of genotypes in employment would prevent, or at least deter, a
wide range of possible stupid genetic discrimination.
Finally, and most importantly, clear federal legislation could
address fears about genetic discrimination. Whether those fears are
justified or not, they exist. And people who are afraid of genetic
discrimination are afraid to take genetic tests that offer the possibility
of improving their health. They may be afraid to take part in genetic
research that could provide important answers to major diseases and
they may not be willing to provide political support for genetic
research. If one believes, as I do, that research in human genetics has
enormous potential for alleviating human suffering, reducing this fear
is important. Having one law, across all states, that clearly prohibits
discrimination on the basis of genotype should go some way to
reducing fear. According to an excellent recent study, genetic
counselors typically tell patients that genetic discrimination is covered

" Lisa Girion, Nurse DerailsGenetic Testing. Wife of Railroad Worker Sparks Probe
That
May Have Wide Implications,LA.TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at W1.
'

Id.

There does appear to be some evidence that many people with a particular rare
genetic condition have, as one of the condition's many symptoms, a propensity to
carpal tunnel syndrome. The railroad seems to have been testing for this condition,
called Hereditary Neuropathy with Liability to Pressure Palsies ("HNPP"). HNPP is
found in about 2 to 5 people out of 100,000-thus, it would be expected to be found
in 5,000 to 15,000 people in the entire United States. The first attack usually occurs in
the patient's teens or twenties. Thomas D. Bird, Hereditary Neuropathy with Liability To
Pressure Palsies Gene Clinics, (June 15, 2000), http://www.geneclinics.org/profiles/
hnpp. It seems likely that someone within the company not only ignored these facts,
but also made the unjustified jump to concluding that a significant fraction of people
uith carpal tunnel syndrome had that genetic condition.
Even with that
misunderstanding, it remains unclear why exactly the railroad was testing people who
already had symptoms; their symptoms alone would be enough, with or without any
h pothetical genetic predisposition, to modify their duties and working environment.
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by a patchwork of inconsistent state laws, all of which have loopholes.' "
One well-written and uniform federal statute could provide
reassurance for those who fear genetic discrimination.
Of course, such reassurance will certainly not be universally
effective. One might argue that a similar result could be reached by
educating people away from their largely unrealistic fears of such
discrimination, but it is hard to believe that such an education
campaign would be more effective than a statute. The costs of welldrafted antidiscrimination legislation are low. The potential benefits
from reducing public fear, though necessarily hard to quantify, seem
to me to justify such legislation, particularly when added to the relief
from real discrimination such a statute would bring to those few
people at risk for rational discrimination and the many at risk for
irrational discrimination.
Federal regulation, as noted above, seems likely to be most
effective in reducing public fears of genetic discrimination. It also can
reach self-insured employee health plans, which, under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, are largely free from state
regulation (although some states have tried to ban genetic
discrimination in such plans). 37 Federal legislation has the further
advantage that good legislative language need be crafted, and a good
political campaign mounted, only once.8 Such federal legislation
needs to have three important substantive characteristics: a careful
definition of the information whose use constitutes discrimination, a
structure for dealing with many of the ancillary issues that will
necessarily arise, and an appropriately limited scope.
The definition of genetic discrimination should regulate the use
of information about a person's genotype, or genetic variations,
however obtained or inferred, but should not add any new regulations
to the use of information about a person's phenotype or actual
expressed characteristics.
Genetic information should thus be
defined very broadly to encompass any other information that
provides probabilistic information about a person's genotype. This
information can come from genetic tests, other medical tests, family

Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and Patients' lear of
Discriminationby Health Insurers: The View from Genetic Counselors,28J.L. MED. & ETIlCS
245 (2000).
s7 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.3 (West Supp. 2001).
38 It is possible, of course, that a state might choose to impose greater restrictions
on the use of genotype discrimination than the federal statute, but that seems unlikely
if the federal statute is reasonable.
-6
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history, diagnoses of traits or conditions, or the taking of (or even
making inquiries about) a genetic test. The information could come
directly from the individual involved or from a relative."
The broad sweep of this definition of genetic information is only
feasible, however, if the definition expressly excludes decisions made
on the individual's phenotype. Otherwise, employers and insurers
could reasonably fear that a person with Huntington disease or early
onset Alzheimer disease could sue for genetic discrimination on the
ground that her condition provided evidence about her genotype.
The way to make this distinction is conceptually straightforward,
though perhaps complicated to implement. The definition should
not cover the use of any information about the individual's own
physical condition or medical symptoms; use of that information
should be permitted to the extent allowed by other laws (such as the
ADA). For example, a health insurer could not use information that
the individual carried a thus far unexpressed genetic susceptibility or
predisposition to a disease, whether or not that information came
from a genetic test, a physical examination, or the expressed
symptoms of family members. It could use, to the extent currently
permitted, information about an individual's medical condition, even
though that condition gave strong evidence about the person's
genotype. This combination means that the statute would forbid
actions based on the individual's genotype, regardless of how
information about that genotype was derived, but would not affect
actions based on the individual's phenotype."' There could, of course,

1 A sibling's genetic test results provide some probabilistic information about an
indiidual's genotypes; a pregnant woman's request that her fetus be tested for an

uncommon genetic condition provides some probabilistic information about both her
genotype and her mate's.

1' Some existing statutes provide for something similar to this exclusion.
For
example, California's ban on genetic discrimination in health coverage bars the use of
genetic characteristics, defined as:
(1) Any scientifically or medically identifiable gene or chromosome, or

combination or alteration thereof, that is knoun to be a cause of a disease or
disorder in a person or his or her offspring, or that is determined to be
associated ith a statistically increased risk of development of a disease or
disorder, and that is pesenty not associated with any symptoms of any disease or
(2) Inherited characteristics that may derive from the individual or family
member, that are known to be a cause of a disease or disorder in a person or
his or her offspring, or that are determined to be associated with a statistically
increased risk of development of a disease or disorder, and that are presently not
a'sociabdwith any symptoms of any disease or disorder.

C,,L. HEALTH & SAFE1Y CODE § 1374.7(d) (West 2000) (emphasis added).

The
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always be some arguments about whether a physiological change in
the phenotype, such as an unusual form of a protein, was information
about physical condition or a medical symptom. The statute could
address that problem by limiting the use of phenotypic characteristics
in insurance and employment to those that are "medically significant
symptoms."
A well-crafted statute will also need a structure to deal with
ancillary issues. At least with respect to employment, the ADA might
provide a useful structure. For example, a public health and safety
exception might be thought useful. It could be that some genetic
predispositions could greatly increase the risk of sudden death, which
might be dangerous in an airline pilot (or a bus driver). The ADA's
health and safety exception could handle those issues. Similarly, in a
case in which an employer were to claim that an employee's genotype
created special susceptibility to workplace exposures, the ADA's
framework could be used to ask whether the employee could perform
the job functions with a reasonable accommodation that did not
impose an undue burden on the employer. Finally, the ADA's
enforcement mechanisms, both through the EEOC and through the
courts, could be used for this statute.
The third substantive issue concerns the scope of regulation of
genotype discrimination. I believe that, at present, it should be
limited to employment questions and to health coverage (whether
through traditional health insurance, HMOs, or a self-funded
employee health benefit plan).
To the extent that genetic
information allows the confident prediction of future health, that
information might be used in other insurance contexts-life
insurance, disability insurance, and long-term-care insurance-or in
noninsurance matters-such as whether to admit someone to medical
school or allow her to become an adoptive parent. Each possible use
raises its own set of questions. Currently, in the United States at least,
health coverage and employment seem to be the issues of most
general importance and the issues of greatest public concern.
Congress should limit federal legislation to those two areas at this time
and give an agency the responsibility for studying and reporting to
reference to "presently not associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder"
encompasses some of the ideas discussed in text, although it is somewhat vague
(associated with any symptoms in whom?). This statute excludes any characteristics
that are presently associated with symptoms from the definition of genetic
characteristics; it would be better to include information about an individual's
genotype derived from his symptoms in the category of genetic information but to
allow it to be the basis for employer or insurer decisions.
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Congress on possible extensions of the genotype discrimination
statute to other fields.
Finally, federal genotype discrimination legislation needs to be
more than substantively careful. It needs to be pursued in a way that
does not cause undue anxiety-or encourage undue genetic
determinism.
Dictating the substance of legislation is difficult
enough; for an academic to prescribe the political process through
which it should be adopted may be delusional. But it would be best if
this legislation could be passed without a major political campaign,
preferably with the advance agreement of the affected business and
consumer constituencies. Surprisingly, this may not be that difficult
to reach. Employers, though loath to accept any new limitations on
employment discrimination, should prefer a uniform and carefully
drawn federal rule to a variety of state laws. The major health insurers
and HMOs do the bulk of their business through employer-provided
plans that do not medically underwrite. That business would not be
affected by this legislation. Only the small, medically underwritten
health insurance market would be affected and it is already dealing
with less clear legislation in almost every state. The very fact of the
passage of so much state legislation is some evidence that the major
political interests affected by it can live with it. An agreement on
federal legislation that would avoid an inflammatory, and quite likely
misleading, political fight may well be possible, perhaps brokered by
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries that hope to profit
most directly by the genetics revolution.
CONCLUSION

This argument in favor of laws regulating genetic discrimination
started by addressing all the weaknesses in the case.
This
Counterpoint illustrates some dangers of the Point/Counterpoint
format.
The human genome and its workings are nearly as
complicated as human societies and their workings-neither benefits
from overzealous expression.
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